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Abstract
Purpose –Within the context of widespread donor support for producer organizations, the purpose of
this paper is to examine the impact of interventions aimed at rescuing a failed cooperative and
improving performance and business linkages between grower-suppliers and international markets
through enterprise development.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper reports a case study of a Nicaraguan coffee cooperative,
Soppexcca, which received substantial donor support at the time of the international coffee crisis between
1999 and 2004. The study used a framework of organizational structure, strategy, empowerment, and
performance to assess business performance and sustainability. Quantitative and qualitative data
collection focussed on asset building and changes during the period 2005-2009.
Findings – Soppexcca achieved major advances in asset building. External interventions played a
pivotal role in building organizational capacity to respond to buyers’ demands and market-related
shocks. Support was received not only from donors but also from supply chain partners and third-
sector organizations. However, important gaps remain, and addressing these gaps requires changes in
Soppexcca and sustained support.
Research limitations/implications – As a case study, findings cannot be readily generalized but
the implications will be of significance beyond the coffee sector in Nicaragua, wherever and in
whatever sector building cooperative capacity is an important development objective.
Social implications – Experience with Soppexcca shows that the creation of sustainable collective
organizations is a long-term process, particularly in respect of building human capital.
Originality/value – The paper examines enterprise development using concepts of capital asset
formation and cooperative performance, and argues the significance of effective links between value
chain stakeholders as well as internal cooperative performance.
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Following considerable debate on market-oriented development approaches such as
business development services and making markets work for the poor, researchers
and development practitioners have shown growing interest in supporting new or
improved value chain links between smallholders and other market actors (Humphrey
and Navas-Alemán, 2010; Stoian et al., 2012). Market-oriented development for
addressing poverty reduction responds to the need to re-invigorate rural development
through, among other things, increased income and a decent standard of living for people
in developing and emerging economies (World Bank, 2007). Rapid growth in demand for
agrifood products in which smallholders are considered to have a comparative
advantage, such as fresh produce and specialty coffee that require extensive labor inputs,
creates significant opportunities for market-oriented development. Success in demanding
agrifood markets requires smallholders and small businesses to meet high specifications
for delivery, volume, and quality, including food safety standards, as well as maintain
strong links with processors and other chain actors further downstream.
Development interventions can play an important role in facilitating smallholders’
and small businesses’ ability to participate in these markets (Webber and Labaste,
2010). Intervention design will vary according to the local context as well as the
particular interests of funding and implementing organizations (Poole et al., 2013).
Some interventions will target privately owned businesses that purchase from
smallholders, with the assumption that interventions lead to increased sourcing from
smallholders. Other interventions may target improvements in the overall business
environment, for example, by facilitating price information to producers and traders or
quality information to consumers (The Springfield Centre, 2008). Many interventions
target collective producer organizations. Interventions may support the capacity of
collective organizations to add value to primary production through more advanced
forms of processing, with the expectation that will smallholders will benefit through
higher raw material prices. Interventions may also exert leverage over cooperative
structures with the aim to increase smallholders’ access to important services, such as
technical assistance and credit – services for which the private sector, and in some cases,
government agencies have been unable to effectively provide. Many interventions also
target social objectives of collective organizations (Donovan and Poole, 2013).
Surveys of the literature and numerous case studies confirm the scale of the
challenge for developing collective smallholder organizations (Kachule et al., 2005;
Donovan et al., 2008; Poole and de Frece, 2010). There is general recognition that such
organizations need considerable external support and productive relations with other
chain actors; however, analyses and discussions have yet to cover in depth the complex
value chain linkages between smallholder suppliers, collective enterprises, external
donors and NGOs, and private sector buyers/intermediaries. Bijman et al. (2011) have
drawn attention to the importance of community and democratic governance of
cooperatives in value chains. They highlight the tension that arises as a cooperative
grows or becomes more heterogeneous, whereby the benefits of democratic governance
become attenuated by hierarchical arrangements as the need for efficiency increases.
Thus the relationship between cooperative organization structure, strategy and
performance are critical. Nevertheless, Bijman et al. (2011) do not consider how tensions
between these variables affect stakeholders external to the cooperative, which are no
less important for efficient management than the tensions common among internal
stakeholders (Ortiz-Miranda et al., 2010). While touching on important issues, their




Among other reports, recent action research has explored “upgrading” as a means
for poor producers to escape poverty (Mitchell and Coles, 2011), and also how fair trade
organic cooperatives, such as those for coffee export, can create multiple benefits for
members and poor households (Gitter et al., 2012). Nevertheless, more detailed cases
are needed of enterprise linkages throughout the chain. In particular, the role of
cooperatives in value chains needs more examination as they attempt to address the
socioeconomic needs of small-scale producers and the market efficiency and
sustainability concerns of other stakeholders: donors, NGOs, and private sector buyers.
This paper examines the potential of cooperatives to engage with development
organizations and commercial buyers to improve their business and social
performance. It recognizes that cooperatives have the double burden of developing
into viable businesses in altogether difficult environments by helping members to
upgrade their productive economic capacities and business linkages between grower-
suppliers and international markets, as well as addressing broader development
objectives such as empowerment. We report a case study of a large Nicaraguan coffee
cooperative, Soppexcca, which received substantial donor and buyer support at the
time of the international coffee crisis between 1999 and 2004 – a period when coffee
prices fell below the cost of production for many smallholders in Central America
(Bacon, 2005). External support was used in part to build the management capacities of
Soppexcca and its assets for processing, storage, and transport of coffee. However,
most of the support addressed the direct needs of the Soppexcca membership,
including the need to revitalize coffee production following the crisis. The paper draws
on livelihoods literature and develops a framework linking investments in capital asset
formation and cooperative performance, and throws light on the significance and
development of links between producers, collective organization, the private sector and
market development donor organizations.
Section 2 reflects on collective organizations[1] and business viability, and introduces
the asset framework for the assessment of Soppexcca. Section 3 provides background
information on Nicaragua, introduces the case study cooperative Soppexcca, and
describes the interventions for developing the value chain. Section 4 explains the
methods used for data collection. Section 5 presents the results concerning the changes
in asset endowments over the five-year period 2005-2009. In the final section, we discuss
the implications of the finding for the design and assessment of organization
development: the Soppexcca case illustrates in particular the pitfalls faced, the support
received, and potential short-cuts for achieving cooperative development in less time
and with fewer resources.
2. Rural collective organizations
Forming sustainable value chain links between smallholder farmers and buyers of
specialty food products typically requires long-term support in building the capacities
of producer organizations. There is much evidence that collective enterprise can play
an important role in building sustainable market linkages between smallholders and
intermediary firms by correcting some market imperfections such as high transaction
costs and missing credit markets, and filling coordination gaps (Sergaki, 2010; Gitter
et al., 2012). Moreover, by organizing collectively, smallholder farmers may be more
able to obtain necessary information, reach quality standards, and operate on a larger
scale by pooling their financial and labor resources (Markelova et al., 2009). There is





development based around technology generation and product transformation
(Bebbington et al., 1996; Molnar et al., 2007; Abebaw and Haile, 2013).
The commitment of international agencies to cooperatives is unchanging.
A recent Parliamentary report to the UK government recommends policies which
direct development support to collective enterprise through organizations such as
cooperatives (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2013), and
follows reiterated commitments by major international organizations. Nevertheless,
there are emerging differences in modalities of delivering support. For example, like
many other organizations, the World Bank continues to advocate the strengthening of
producer organizations as a means for increasing smallholders’ access per se to market
opportunities and to enhance empowerment (World Bank, 2007, 2013). However,
a business focus through improved supply chain management and coordination with
the private sector is also considered essential to compete in growing higher-value
markets. The World Bank strategy of linking with the private sector is endorsed by the
FAO in its latest report on The State of Food and Agriculture (FAO, 2013). IFAD, on the
other hand, also committed to smallholder farming, are pioneering an approach
whereby funding of producer organizations is being channeled by a government directly
to the farmers (IFAD, 2013). The existence of a strong national confederation of farmer
organizations is a significant enabling feature of this intervention.
No one best way has been found to support the development of producer
organizations. There have been many poor experiences, and also successes tempered
by disadvantages. Poole and de Frece (2010) and Mitchell and Coles (2011) among
others have analyzed and summarized the strengths and weaknesses of formal
cooperatives. Cooperatives tend to have diverse concurrent and often conflicting
objectives which can be summarized in two points: first, economic and business
development; and second, social inclusion and empowerment. The part that
organizational capacity building plays in creating viable enterprises is foundational.
A persistent theme is that farmer cooperatives lack financial capital to grow in scale
and complexity, particularly for investment in physical assets and value addition
through processing and manufacturing. They also lack human capital in the form
of professional management and efficient governance. Market operations and
relationships with both supplier members and buyers tend to be bureaucratic and
unresponsive. Moreover, rural cooperatives tend to operate in environments that do not
favor enterprise development and suffer from incomplete and irregular access to
technical, business, and financial services. According to Poole and de Frece (2010) there
are many features of groups and management that are known to be important
for producer cooperatives, and there is no absolute guidance about what does and
does not work. As circumstances vary, different features can enhance or impair group
performance. For a second tier cooperative such as the Nicaraguan cooperative Soppexcca,
which is the object of this study, first, the relationship with the membership of the base
cooperatives is an important dimension. Second, critical to its international exports will be
the enterprise linkages with the downstream buyers who supply coffee to overseas
markets. Finally, relationships with development organizations and lenders are important
for providing services to poor small-scale coffee producers, such as technical assistance
and credit; for addressing environmental concerns and improving the wellbeing of its
members; and for financing long-term investments in infrastructure expansion.
Despite the various theoretical explanations for the failure or underperformance,
investment in cooperatives remains an important tool for addressing the social and




continue to hold true: the potential for exploiting production and managerial economies
of scale, overcoming market entry barriers, reducing transaction costs, and cultivating
supply chain relationships. Where collective organization is necessary for linking
producers with private sector development, the key question becomes, how to develop
viable cooperatives with fewer external resources and in less time? As noted above,
the ability of cooperatives to build their organizational assets, in the form of human,
social, financial, and physical assets is critical. But asset building alone is not sufficient
to achieve economic and social objectives. In addition, the mechanisms for leveraging
assets depend on the organizational characteristics of structure, strategy, and
empowerment (Kachule et al., 2005). Poole and de Frece (2010) develop these notions
as follows:
(1) Structure: performance is closely linked to organizational structure with
respect to scale and scope of activities (such as delivering input supplies,
provision of information and training, product processing and accessing
markets), constitution and governance, and management attributes.
(2) Strategy: the deliberative processes whereby organizations develop market
position and power in negotiation through alliances and scale, and the creation
and/or exploitation of sustainable competitive advantages – but these depend
on the dynamics of values, governance, and leadership.
(3) Empowerment: mainly concerned with the creation of social and other forms of
capital assets, empowerment comes about through participation, individual
and collective capacity building, representation, and democratic governance.
(4) Performance: the outcomes are measured against economic and social objectives
indicating the extent to which the organization achieves higher levels of
efficiency (financial stability and investment in assets) and effectiveness
(quality of goods and services provided) – and equity (distribution of risks and
rewards, rights and responsibilities). In an agro-ecological context, environmental
sustainability considerations assume major importance.
The following framework summarizes how pre-existing organizational capital assets,
plus external development inputs in the form of technical, financial, and other support
from donors and value chain partners, condition the structure and strategy of the
organization. Additionally, in the case of a collective entity, the member empowerment
processes are fundamental for organization-building. These elements condition the
performance of the organizations (and in turn are influenced by performance), as
shown in Figure 1.
In this study, indicators of changes in capital assets were assessed for the coffee
cooperative and for the changes in the quality of its upstream and downstream chain
links, in order to assess the impact of interventions aimed at improving structure,
strategy, and empowerment with respect to business viability and linkages between
grower-suppliers and international markets.
3. Case study background
3.1 Nicaragua, the coffee crisis and poverty reduction
Nicaragua is the second poorest country in Latin America after Haiti and has a
significant rural sector. Agricultural exports total almost 75 percent of total exports





added as a proportion of GDP reached 21.5 percent in 2011 after fluctuating between
18.3 and 20.2 percent during the period 2001-2010 (World Bank, 2012). Among
agricultural products exported by Nicaragua, coffee is the most important, comprising
37 percent of the total value of agricultural exports in 2008 (CEPAL, 2009). The recent
history of coffee production in Nicaragua is marked by the “coffee crisis” – a period
between 1999 and 2004 when prices did not allow coffee producers to cover their
variable costs of production, causing major economic and social hardship to producers
and laborers, as well as reduced investment in coffee production.
At the time of the coffee crisis, there were about 48,000 coffee farmers in Nicaragua,
80 percent of whom were small producers with o3.5 ha under cultivation (Flores et al.,
2002). Nicaragua’s average coffee productivity, at 1,480 pounds/ha, made it one of the
least productive producers of Central America, at roughly 50 percent the productivity
of Costa Rica and 40 percent the productivity of Guatemala (Varangis et al., 2003).
Despite the large number of smallholders, farms larger than 3.5 ha produced more than
85 percent of the national coffee harvest due to higher intensity of management and
access to purchased production inputs.
Among donors, academics, and NGOs, consensus emerged that the most promising
response in Central America to the coffee crisis involved developing market linkages
between smallholder producers and buyers of specialty coffee, including certified fair-
trade and organic coffee (USAID, 2004; Kilian et al., 2006). Development interventions
focussed on improving quality in production and post-harvest management,
facilitating access to organic and fair-trade certification, and strengthening collective
organizations.
Two significant findings from the coffee crisis are relevant: first, certification
enhanced prices and market prospects. According to Bacon (2005), during the coffee
crisis, price premia rose to approximately 40-50 percent over prices offered by local
intermediaries, and cooperatives secured access to credit and more favorable
marketing conditions. Valkila and Nygren (2010) agree that successful Nicaraguan fair-
trade certified cooperatives were able to pay a significantly higher price to members
than the mainstream market; they cite Soppexcca, the object of this study, as having
paid members 84 US cents/pound (lb) of green coffee during the 2003-2004 season
compared with Exportadora Atlantic SA, one of the largest corporate coffee exporters,
which paid on average 48.8 US cents/lb in the period December 1, 2003-March 31, 2004.


























smallholders’ ability to enhance coffee productivity, in addition to quality enhancement
and achieving certification (Valkila, 2009; Wilson, 2010). Subsequent work has
continued to highlight the importance of quality and certification in specialty coffee
markets. González-Pérez and Gutiérrez-Viana (2012) reported a comparative analysis of
the coffee trade in Vietnam and Colombia, respectively, the second and third largest
producing countries after Brazil. They identified the attention given in Colombia to
quality, social, and environmental considerations as a source of competitive
advantage in specialty consumer markets, compared with Vietnam where cost
advantages prevail.
Second, improvements in production and marketing, including certification, have
been made possible through collective organization. The study by Haggar et al. (2012)
of the costs and benefits of coffee production in Nicaragua illustrates the growing
importance of sustainable certification to the country and more specifically for
smallholders. Besides the environmental and economic analysis, they also analyzed the
management capacity building program for two farmer cooperatives that commercialize
certified coffee. The results of the training were found to differ between the two
organizations depending on initial capacities. The authors assert that achieving
successful accreditation is a lengthy process consuming considerable management and
administrative resources, and significantly, external financial support from private sector
coffee traders or from donors is necessary. Cooperatives are not the only model for
business development, but, as shown below, are a predominant feature of the Nicaraguan
policy and organizational landscape.
3.2 Nicaragua and the cooperative movement
Historically, in Nicaragua as in other countries, cooperatives have been not just an
alternative form of business organization, but specifically an integral part of a social
movement with political undertones. Kroeker (1996) traced the historical background of
the cooperative movement in Nicaragua to grassroots efforts in the 1930s to redress
inequalities of land tenure and economic opportunity. Prior to 1979, and more explicitly
under the Sandinista regime during the 1980s onwards, the ideal was empowerment of
the poor and powerless through collective action, new structures and relationships:
for Nicaragua, “‘Empowerment’ refers to the ability of individuals and groups to act on
their own to achieve their self-defined goals” (Bacon, 2010, p. 53). Bacon distinguished
three types of empowerment: personal, relational, and collective. In practice, over-
formalization of cooperatives and contradictions in support policies of the Sandinista
government post-1979 limited empowerment and the development of autonomous
and sustainable collective organizations.
Coherence within the cooperative movement was frustrated by the years of civil war
and ineffective post-war governance. After the Sandinista government lost elections in
1990, the role of the state in the coffee sector declined. Conflict, agrarian reform, and
cooperative development under the Sandinista government post-1979 created a path
dependence in agrarian development and enterprise in favor of cooperative
organization; in the words of Fraser et al. (2013, p. 10): “memories of the war and
expectations that policy reform could provide access to land and services have each
played their part in the process of imagining development in a country on the edge of
the world economy.”
Kroeker (1996) outlined how a widespread lack of leadership and sustainable
and professional management skills hampered organizational development within





cooperatives. Her overall argument was that cooperative organizations needed a long-
term process of “accompaniment” by outsiders who were willing to gain a profound
understanding of the grassroots reality at the same time as introducing expertise to
promote organizational growth and empowerment. Bacon (2010) also emphasized
the historical dimension of Nicaraguan cooperative organization. Like Kroeker, he
reported how the cooperative movement served as a means whereby smallholders might
preserve their social and economic empowerment and enhance their opportunities
through integration into fair-trade networks. The latter surge in cooperative development
was an explicit response to the global coffee crisis. Collaborative innovations in market
linkages were developed to attenuate the plunge in product prices, including the
development of “relationship coffees.” Thus cooperatives were the prevailing focus of
smallholder organization, the target of interventions by international donors and NGOs,
and the means of gaining certification, specialty market positioning and price premia in
discerning consumer markets.
3.3 The origins of Soppexcca
The case study presented here focusses on one such organizational intervention,
Soppexcca. Critical support came from a group of European coffee buyers who were
seeking to recuperate their financial losses following the collapse of Soppexcca’s
predecessor cooperative, Jiprocoop. In 1997, after five years of exporting fair-trade
coffee to European buyers, Jiprocoop had declared that it would not be able to meet its
contractual obligations for the delivery of green coffee. During the previous year,
Jiprocoop had received US$640,000 in “pre-financing” from six buyers (approximately
60 percent of the value of the contracts). However, poor oversight of the cooperative’s
administration allowed for theft of the pre-financing by the cooperative’s manager and
the Export Committee (Denaux, 2008). Without funds for pre-financing, Jiprocoop was
unable to establish supply agreements with its members and thus was unable to obtain
the coffee needed to repay the pre-financing. By 1999, Jiprocoop’s debt, including interest,
to its buyers had reached US$722,991. Jiprocoop was declared insolvent in 1997.
Following the insolvency of Jiprocoop, five of the six European debt-holding coffee
buyers offered a solution for repaying the debt, based on their lack of confidence in
cooperative governance structures for making the sacrifices required to repay the debt.
A new corporate entity would be created which would hold the debt of the defunct
Jiprocoop, with which the buyers would continue to trade. This offered the prospects of
recovering the losses incurred by mismanagement, ensuring supplies to the European
market of the high-quality coffee, and at the same time pursuing the development
agenda for the coffee growers. Thus was created Soppexcca, a firm in which the buyers
would have a strong management hand, constituted as a “corporation,” rather than
a cooperative. The corporate structure enabled efficient and professional governance in
the interests of shareholders first rather than other stakeholders such as the coffee
growers – and avoided the collective and democratic governance and returns to
membership associated with common cooperative principles.
The five debt-holding coffee buyers held the majority of shares in the newly formed
corporation. They froze interest on the debt, continued to buy coffee from Soppexcca
with pre-financing. Producer-members agreed to repay the debt through 50 percent
reductions in their price premiums for certified coffee. Soppexcca gradually repaid its
debt obligations and expanded commercial relations with coffee buyers in the USA.





In 2004 the buyer/owners allowed Soppexcca to be reorganized itself as a cooperative
with producer-members’ interests paramount, but retaining the professional
management. The reversion to the cooperative form post-recovery reflected a desire to
return the organization to the hands of the member-stakeholders, to avoid taxes
not levied on cooperatives and to receive further support from development
organizations that would be unavailable to a corporate organization.
At the time of the research, Soppexcca incorporated 16 base cooperatives, each
electing two representatives to participate in the general assembly, from which
Soppexcca’s volunteer member-leaders were elected (e.g. president, vice president,
members of the oversight, and credit committees).
3.4 Interventions and asset rebuilding
Between 2003 and 2009, Soppexcca received technical and financial support from
NGOs and bilateral donors and credit services from fair-trade lending organizations
that totaled approximately US$2.1 million. These interventions and services provided
for the following investments in Soppexcca itself and in its service offer to members:
(1) infrastructure development, including the purchase of a dry-mill, offices
for Soppexcca and 11 of its base cooperatives, equipment for two retail
coffee shops;
(2) provision of technical assistance to members, for both conventional and
organic production;
(3) provision of short and long-term credit to members for coffee production, the
rejuvenation of coffee plantations following the crisis, and for upgrading
wet-milling infrastructure;
(4) quality and productivity enhancement, including construction of a cupping
laboratory, soil and water analysis, training program for extension agents, and
construction of an organic fertilizer production plant; and
(5) addressing symptoms of poverty beyond coffee, including provision of
health and educational supplies to Soppexcca members, as well as support for
education and training in cooperative leadership.
The considerable financial and technical support provided to Soppexcca can be
rationalized in the context of the coffee crisis, the inability of the Nicaraguan
government to provide services to the coffee sector, and the overall importance of coffee
for achieving social and environmental goals, and the self-interest of commercial
partners. Between 2002 and 2006, Soppexcca’s membership increased from 150 to 500.
This was due, in part, to the coffee crisis (with households seeking better marketing
opportunities), and by Soppexcca’s efforts to support households with newly acquired
rights over their land.
4. Study design and methods
This case forms part of a larger effort by the Ford Foundation and international
researchers and practitioners to better understand the ability of smallholders to
participate in and benefit from value chain development (Donovan and Stoian, 2012).
An important focus of attention was the role of collective action in facilitating
the participation of smallholders in value chains for more demanding markets, how





organizations can pursue the desired performance objectives. The focus here is on
organization-building. NGOs, projects, and non-for-profit lending organizations
provided technical and financial support aimed to address the negative implications
of the coffee crisis through the building of relationships in certified coffee markets.
Support from the private sector included services that were embedded in trading
relationships, such as no-interest advance payments on coffee purchases.
After exploratory and participatory research to validate concepts and methodology,
asset changes were assessed using a series of indicators for human, social, physical,
and financial capital. For Soppexcca, the following proxy indicators were used to
identify the extent to which the organization is able to leverage its characteristics of
structure, strategy, empowerment, and performance for achieving economic and
social objectives:
(1) Human capital: networking building with external stakeholders, development
of technical skills for coffee production.
(2) Social capital: reciprocity in value chain relationships with coffee buyers,
investments in governance skills.
(3) Physical capital: investments in machinery and infrastructure for primary
production and value addition.
(4) Financial capital: loan repayment and provision of member finance.
Data collection were conducted in Jinotega and Matagalpa (north-central Nicaragua)
throughout 2009 and focussed on organization-building and changes in the business
viability of Soppexcca during the period 2004/2005-2008/2009. More than 20 key
informant interviews were carried out with Soppexcca leaders, international coffee
buyers, certification agents, and other relevant actors and were supplemented by
secondary information from Soppexcca. These data were triangulated against survey
data from 296 of the roughly 500 members of the cooperative, covering 11 of Soppexcca’s
18 base cooperatives. To the extent possible, quantitative information was collected to
understand the changes in assets, and qualitative information was used to understand
the relevance of and the reasons for the changes.
5. Results
This section examines changes in capital assets of the coffee cooperative Soppexcca
and the extent to which these changes led to improved business viability in terms of
organizational structure, strategy, performance, and empowerment. As detailed in the
following discussions, Soppexcca achieved major advances in asset building and these
interventions played a pivotal role in building the organization’s capacity to respond
to buyers’ demands and market-related shocks. However, results also show that
important gaps remain and that addressing these gaps implies changes in how
Soppexcca operates and in how interventions for value chain development are designed
and assessed.
5.1 Human capital
This section evaluates changes in skills and capacities of Soppexcca’s governance to
sustain relations with buyers, NGOs, and member households; provide effective





5.1.1 Networking with buyers and NGOs. Before the assessment period, Soppexcca
had demonstrated an ability to contract buyers for the purchase and selling of
coffee and secure NGO collaboration for supporting smallholder producers. This was
due, in large part, to the installation by the debt-holding coffee buyers of a professional
manager whose salary during her first years of service was covered from external
sources. Since the beginning of Soppexcca, she had been responsible for all strategic
planning. All the coffee buyers interviewed for this study expressed their unconditional
trust in the cooperative’s management. However, they also mentioned how
communication stopped when the manager was out of contact and that the overall
costs of coordination with Soppexcca were high, due to information blackouts.
Similarly, NGOs commented that they found difficulty in obtaining timely
information from Soppexcca to comply with its donor reporting requirements. There
too, information blackouts were common, best resolved through repeated and frequent
visits by NGO staff to Soppexcca offices. The organization struggled with managing
the information demands by buyers and NGOs, in addition to the information needed to
run their business and evidence suggests that while Soppexcca management had the
skills, it lack the capacity to manage effectively the many demands placed on it by
buyers, NGOs, and other service providers and by members.
5.1.2 Investments in technical assistance. Good practices in production, harvesting,
and wet-milling are essential for delivery of quality coffee to the processor-exporters.
For most households interviewed, Soppexcca was the only provider of technical
assistance during the assessment period, and substantial investments were made.
Beginning in 2007, a team of eight extensionists was employed to provide technical
assistance and access to development projects, which have played a role in expanding
the options available for agricultural production (e.g. cocoa, small livestock).
Soppexcca’s human capacity to provide technical assistance expanded markedly
during the assessment period but remained dangerously dependent on external
support. Despite the increase in staff from two prior to 2006, to seven in 2007, their
overall capacity to provide technical assistance was limited by the scope of activities.
Extensionists were charged with assisting households in coffee production and
post-harvest management, estimating and monitoring coffee production for the credit
department, and participating in and carrying out training on various social subjects
such as gender promotion. Each extensionist was assigned to between one and three
base cooperatives. The salaries of all extensionists were covered entirely by project
funds. At the time of data collection, the renewal of contracts for five extensionists was
in jeopardy, subject to new sources of funding.
According to evidence from household and key informant interviews extensionists
were not equipped with the incentives, tools, or training to address the farm-level
production problems of resource-poor households. Among the concerns expressed,
the lead extensionist said that staff were overburdened (each extensionist with 60-70
households) and were unable to target assistance to households based on need. There
was a lack of coordination between technical assistance and the credit department, and
they suffered from low motivation and limited skills (three were fired in 2009 for low
performance or unprofessional behavior), a tendency to provide recommendations with
limited understanding of the coffee plantation, and poor skills to communicate
effectively with primary producers. Members commonly pointed to a lack of attention
and capacity to identify appropriate solutions to technical production problems.





contractual situation was identified by extensionists during interviews as a major
source of concern. Physical insecurity was also a factor: in 2009, a newly hired
extensionist was murdered in an attempted robbery while returning from a
base-cooperative training event.
Weaknesses in technical capacity were evident in the perceptions by members of the
quality of services provided between 2007/2008 and 2008/2009. Among the sampled
households, 44 percent (n¼ 129) reported being dissatisfied or highly dissatisfied with
technical assistance provision. Selected household responses shed light on the nature of
the problem:
Household #26: “We were visited once in 2008, but the extensionist didn’t provide technical
advice; he arrived to inform us of a meeting at the cooperative.”
Household #265: “I lack advice when I need it: on one occasion I requested a visit from the
extensionist because the coffee berries were falling off the branches, but he never arrived.”
Household #277: “Visits are only for estimating the harvest – the extensionist does not know
my coffee plantation. He sends others from the community to assist me and does not provide
recommendations.”
5.2 Social capital
The nature and strength of Soppexcca’s relationships with its buyers and its members
provides the basis for analysis of social capital endowment. The member survey and
key informant interviews with staff, elected leaders, and coffee buyers provided the
information for assessment.
5.2.1 Relationships with buyers. The 2008-2009 harvest was sold to seven buyers:
five from Europe, who purchased 59 percent of the total volume exported, and two from
the USA, who purchased the remaining 41 percent. The five European buyers had
purchased roughly the same amount of coffee (usually between one and two containers
per year) from Soppexcca every year since 1999 – the year that Soppexcca first
exported coffee after Jiprocoop’s collapse. US buyers began to purchase coffee after
the 2003-2004 harvest. The addition of the US buyers followed a period of rapid
expansion in membership which allowed for increased export volumes. Interviews with
European buyers suggested that strong links existed before the assessment period, due
initially to Soppexcca’s commitment to repay the debt left behind by Jiprocoop. Effective
professional management and compliance with contractual terms reinforced this initial
trust over time. None of the interviewed buyers reported major problems over the quality
of coffee delivered or with compliance with contractual terms (including repayment of
pre-financing). One buyer regarded Soppexcca as the most reliable among the ten
cooperatives in Latin America from which it purchased coffee.
Buyers were asked to identify problems encountered in their communication and
coordination with Soppexcca during their business relationship. Responses indicated
that relationships exhibited unusually high levels of trust, on the one hand, and
frustration at the inefficiency of communications and apprehension regarding
Soppexcca’s viability, on the other. According to one buyer:
We feel a special trust with Soppexcca. They kept paying off the debt even though they
didn’t have to.
Trust was reflected in tangible ways. For example, when Soppexcca expressed




competition during the harvest season, buyers agreed to adjust their price formula so
that prices offered were more in line with local prices. One noted that:
If Soppexcca has to request an adjustment in their price, then there is always a good and
transparent reason.
However, communication and coordination was criticized. Buyers reported information
blackouts when Soppexcca experienced problems with delivery of a container. Lack of
communication about delays left buyers unprepared for the arrival of containers,
resulting in extra port charges incurred by the buyer. Communication tended to suffer
when the manager was away:
It is very hard to get communication from other Soppexcca staff; communication is very much
focused on [the manager] noted one buyer.
Given the inherently risky nature of coffee production efficient communication is prized
by buyers. One buyer made an annual trip to Soppexcca’s office to get information on
expected production volumes and local marketing conditions. Information collected
also provided the buyer with inputs for the promotion of their product in Europe.
The buyer added:
We would prefer that the information we need were provided in a less costly manner, but we
have learned to adjust to the situation.
While overall confidence in Soppexcca by its buyers was exceptionally high prior to
and during the assessment period, buyers expressed concern about the durability of
their business relationship, especially due to the concentration of responsibility in the
manager. As stated by one buyer:
What would happen if [she] left? It would be hard to understand the change in our
relationship with Soppexcca if she left […] We want and need more people in Soppexcca that
we can rely on.
5.2.2 Investment in elected leaders. Evidence during the assessment period indicated
that the Board faced major challenges in effective governance. The election of member-
leaders first became part of Soppexcca’s organizational structure when it converted to a
cooperative business. The Board of Directors first met in 2004 and then met regularly
to discuss strategic and operational decisions, such as relations with buyers, credit
providers, and NGOs and setting prices for Soppexcca-provided credit. However, key
informants within and outside Soppexcca argued that the Board failed to carry out its
governance duties fully and effectively. One reason for this was a lack of information
on the strategic objectives of Soppexcca or its financial status. Two key informants
with leadership roles on the Board of Directors in 2009 commented that they were
unaware of the strategic plan and that they had not been able to access up-to-date and
usable information on the financial status. They attributed the lack of financial
information to weaknesses in the administrative department.
Moreover, according to a former member of the Oversight Committee, whose role it
was to monitor financial affairs, during the first two years of this three-year term, he
did not understand how to interpret financial statements. It was not until the final year
of this term that he consulted with an externally hired accountant to review in detail the
financial statements.
Another commented that she received no training in basic business or in cooperative





the Board she had little understanding of how the farmgate price was calculated or of
the contract price for coffee between Soppexcca and its European and US buyers.
What skills and knowledge she gained while on the Board were acquired through
trial and error − a potentially effective yet costly approach to building human and
social capital.
Interviews highlighted Board members’ reluctance to probe the management on
strategic decisions and investments. Interviews with former Board members also
indicated that the Board did not set the agenda for its meetings; rather management
set the agenda, with no consultation. According to one former Board member:
Any effort to discuss the decentralization of Soppexcca’s administration drew criticism from
the other Board members because it was perceived to show a lack of respect for [the manager].
5.3 Physical capital
Notable additions to Soppexcca’s physical capital took place during the assessment
period. Soppexcca began the period with a warehouse financed by donor grants that
received and stored coffee and housed the administrative and technical staff. By the end of
the assessment period, the following additions had been made to physical capital:
(1) 11 basic offices for base cooperatives were constructed in 2008 with project
funds for housing extensionists and providing space for meetings and the
storage of coffee.
(2) A cupping lab was constructed in Matagalpa in 2005 with financial assistance
from an NGO and a US coffee buyer to implement internal quality control
procedures and develop quality-consciousness among members.
(3) In 2007, to add value to green coffee, two retail cafés were constructed in
Jinotega which boosted cooperative revenues and provided employment
opportunities for a small staff derived from the membership.
(4) In 2008, a facility was constructed for the production of chicken-manure
fertilizer to reduce dependence on purchased organic fertilizer and provide for
an additional source of operating funds.
(5) In 2008, Soppexcca purchased its own processing plant at a cost of US$614,344.
Own funds (US$119,344) were derived from the fair-trade premium, and
supplemented by a long-term loan from an US-based lending organization
(US$280,000) and NGO donations (US$215,000).
(6) Other equipment: between 2003 and 2009 additional equipment was acquired
such as trucks, computers and office equipment, mainly with grants from
project funds.
Grants from bilateral donors were essential for building physical capital. From the
perspective of both donors, such investments were in line with their strategy for
increasing the competitiveness of the Central America coffee sector in terms of improved
quality and increased value added. These investments allowed the organization to
increase the range of services offered to members and its income-generating potential.
5.4 Financial capital
5.4.1 Loan repayment. To appreciate how far Soppexcca advanced in financial capital




At the start of the assessment period, Soppexcca still had roughly US$450,000 in
outstanding debt from its predecessor organization. Moreover, it had little to offer its
members in terms of short-term credit – critical for the purchase of fertilizer and for carrying
out coffee tree maintenance. By 2008, however, the debt had been paid off, it expanded its
short-term credit portfolio to approximately US$300,000, and provided long-term credit to
its members. This section discusses how these changes were possible and addresses the
remaining major challenges for further building its financial capital endowments.
Two factors played a major role in the ability to repay the debt inherited from
Jiprocoop:
(1) First, sales of coffee by volume increased significantly during the 2000s, on average
by 25 percent per year between 2001/2002 and 2007/2008. Not only did sales
volumes increase and benefit from the certification price premium, but Soppexcca
diversified its market outlets, making a significant inroad into the US market.
(2) The other contributing factor was the willingness of affiliated households
to accept reduced coffee prices during the period between 2000/2001 and
2007/2008. Producers relinquished 50 percent of the premium obtained from
certification during these years. This arrangement required a major sacrifice on
the part of producing households, as well as a high level of commitment to the
debt-holding coffee buyers.
5.4.2 Capitalization of credit program. Provision of short-term credit secures access to
parchment (dried but unhulled, therefore semi-processed) coffee. Given the lack of
affordable credit for smallholders, access to the credit program provided powerful
incentives for members to comply with the credit terms and to gain benefits to offset the
higher costs of doing business with Soppexcca such as delayed final payment, higher
quality requirements and lack of transport services. Between 2001/2002 and 2007/2008,
Soppexcca achieved a major increase in the size of its short-term credit portfolio.
Delinquency in repayment was a major problem, largely due to the diversion of credit for
other purposes. The increase in the credit portfolio was due to the direct injection of funds
by projects and donors for short-term credit and by the transfer of funding from
long-term credit to short-term credit upon repayment of long-term credit by members.
The offer of long-term credit to members is rare among coffee cooperatives in
Nicaragua. Long-term credit was especially critical because it allowed members to
renew their plantations and expand their coffee holdings. Long-term credit was first
offered in 2002/2003. The total size of the long-term credit portfolio varied from year to
year. In 2007/2008, US$83,303 was offered as long-term credit, all derived from project
funds. Soppexcca’s ability to access funds for long-term credit reflects its strong links
with NGOs during the coffee crisis.
Repayments of long-term loans were channeled into the short-term credit program
rather than reused to provide long-term credit. This reflected the high risks related to
long-term credit provision as well as the more urgent need to secure access to
parchment coffee through the provision of short-term credit.
5.5 Summarizing the principal findings
On the surface, the cooperative appears to be a significant success. Soppexcca repaid
its debt and achieved major advances in asset formation, with external interventions
playing a pivotal role in building capacity to respond to buyers’ demands and





premium prices was the fundamental strategic advantage of the enterprise model.
Moreover, the linkages to external sources of finance and use of the social premium
from fair-trade sales provided much-needed funds for paying down the debt and for
making investments in other forms of capital.
But there are important gaps and weaknesses in asset building that limit its ability
to deliver sustainable benefits to its membership base and reduce its vulnerability to
internal and external shocks:
(1) The strong professional leadership, combined with a long-term commitment
from buyers and NGOs, and the institutional framework provided by fair-trade
certification, all played an important role in building the organization, and
creating trust among external stakeholders.
(2) Relationships between Soppexcca and international buyers were characterized
by high levels of trust, successful flows of high-quality products, but
accompanying information flows were managed less efficiently. Management
responsibility was highly centralized. Therefore, while external stakeholders
were confident in the actual performance of the cooperative, at the same time
they were concerned about the sustainability of the management model.
(3) There were also significant internal management weaknesses: strong personal
relationships and trust were not supplemented by adequate flows of
management information; the need among members for technical assistance
was large and services provision by Soppexcca was constrained by inadequate
management, human and financial resources. Technical assistance depended on
external finance which was limited in scope and delivery, and was not integrated
with the servicing of other business functions such as credit management.
(4) The intention to democratize governance and empower the membership
was afflicted by similar management weaknesses. Lack of training of elected
officials, inadequate information flows and lack of strategic vision left
governance highly centralized, with a lack of willingness to empower the
membership. Thus, the conversion from corporation to cooperative was
somewhat incomplete, and exposes the cooperative to serious management risks.
(5) Social capital-building among the base membership was strong: the provision
of support for health, education, and safety-net services, for example, in the
case of sudden death of family members, was identified by members as a very
important mechanism for strengthening social networks.
(6) Notable additions to Soppexcca’s physical capital were essential for operating
in the high value export markets. Infrastructure development was crucial to
ensure Soppexcca’s long-term ability to sustain relations with buyers and for
expanding future income sources (e.g. purchase of dry mill). However, it can be
questioned whether the considerable sums invested could have been used more
effectively for promoting coffee productivity and other goals among coffee
growing communities.
(7) There was substantial loan repayment. The provision of affordable short- and
long-term credit with capital from international buyers was critical for
strengthening the supply base, and it strengthened the performance and depth




built up during the assessment period, the final balance was still weak
and Soppexcca remained highly dependent on donor funds. The fact that
technical assistance was 100 percent financed by projects was a major
concern. Finally, the use of the fair-trade social premium for debt repayment
again highlights a dilemma faced by Soppexcca in trying to develop a
viable business, while at the same time trying to address the social needs
of its membership.
The factors favoring and limiting the development of Soppexcca are summarized in
Table I, where weaknesses were often the “flip-side” of strengths:
6. Discussion and conclusions
This paper has applied an asset-building lens to assess the development of Soppexcca,
and its ability in collaboration with NGOs, international coffee buyers, and others, to
improve its business performance and viability, while addressing the other needs of its
membership base. Investments made by coffee buyers and external support from
Factors favoring organizational development Constraints to organizational development
Human Strong professional management
supported by strong institutional
linkages
Concentration of power in executive
management threatens succession and
limits sustainability
Strong technical capacity for coffee
production, processing, and certification
Absence of feedback loops on the
effectiveness of services and weak links
between units within the cooperative
administration
Demonstrated ability to find practical
solutions to coffee production and
processing Inadequate technical support to
membership and training
of leaders
Vulnerability to management and
governance risks
Social Significant support to membership through





Weak democratization and ineffective
member participation
Physical Substantial addition to infrastructure
for coffee storage and processing
Lack of additional infrastructure and
logistics provision such as transportation
and secure storage to facilitate members’
coffee deliveriesSubstantial expansion of administrative
space for base cooperatives and the
central second-tier organization
Financial Core business operations (collecting,
processing, and export of green coffee)
appear to be economically viable
Scale limited by low productivity in coffee
production and inability to expand credit
offer and membership size
Considerable loan repayment giving
greater financial stability and reduced
indebtedness
Dependence on external funds for
technical assistance, coffee purchases,
infrastructure expansion, and credit
programs likely to continue for the
short-medium term
Effective provision of essential short-term









NGOs and donors had led to the formation, out of the ashes of its predecessor Jiprocoop,
of a new organization called Soppexcca. This pattern conforms to the phenomenon of
“phoenix organizations,” where a viable organization is re-built out of initial collapse
through a new and more rigorous (re-) start-up (Kachule et al., 2005). Initially
constituted as a corporation, Soppexcca achieved stability through debt repayment and
then entered a period of growth. The turnaround was a function of external support,
the imposition of strong management by debt-holding coffee buyers, and a willingness
of the membership to accept financial sacrifice in the form of reduced coffee
prices. With the mutual agreement of coffee buyers and coffee growers, Soppexcca
was reconverted into a collectively owned business. The changes in organizational
assets of the renewed cooperative were monitored during the recovery period and need
to be set against the framework of organizational structure, strategy, performance
and empowerment introduced in Section 2 to assess business sustainability and
performance.
Regarding the organizational structure, the growth in membership and in
sales improved the economic scale of Soppexcca. The external technical, managerial
and financial inputs enhanced the delivery of various services to the membership,
and enabled valuable credit services and asset building by the organization – and by
members. Future growth in membership, but without additional access to credit lines,
signals the need for Soppexcca and its supporters to address the low productivity of its
grower-members and ensure coffee supplies of high quality and quantity.
The corporate form initially adopted for the turnaround was successful.
Once the international buyers’ exposure to the debt risk had been reduced,
reversion to a membership organization partially attenuated the external leverage
over organizational management. Although the leadership currently in place
has been successful, the lack of democratization and transparency suggest that
adequate safeguards against the recurrence of the original problems of
mismanagement and corruption have not been put in place. Current governance is
effective, but comes at the cost of an increased risk to succession following the
current manager. The lack of skilled management in Nicaragua means that there has
been no alternative.
Regarding strategy, the investments in productive assets by Soppexcca and its
members, the development of effective systems for ensuring coffee quality,
and the existence of a stable and professional management have positioned
Soppexcca firmly in the international certified coffee value chain. These linkages
provided the foundation for future interactions with donors and fair-trade
organizations, which would later offer the critical support needed for building
productive assets and improving quality. The transition to a new membership
organization was promoted by the international buyer-partners and enabled producers
to maintain access to the competitive specialty fair-trade market and premium
prices and to regain the taxation advantages and ease of certification of the cooperative
form. Soppexcca’s ability to respond to the needs of its buyers has not diminished
with collective ownership.
However, evidence of progress towards empowerment of the producer-members
was mixed. On one hand, smallholder members’ own capacities to engage in higher
value and volume coffee production through their link to the resurgent organization
was increased. Members often benefited financially through their coffee sales to
Soppexcca, although the most significant benefits were concentrated among the larger




smallholder coffee production, including technical assistance and credit. The provision
of social services by Soppexcca was significant, but was a welfare function rather than
something that resulted in member empowerment. On the other hand, the new
governance structure did not facilitate effective member participation. There is a
significant risk in the failure to engage and train the membership in organizational
governance, alongside the potential adverse consequences of the concentration of
management power.
Thus, in performance terms, social and economic objectives have both been partially
met. However, the tantalizing prospect of long-term sustainability requires a process of
serious change in representation, decision making, information handling and human
capacity building to sustain the gains in efficiency and effectiveness. It is noteworthy
that in her analysis of the ethics of fair trade, Utting (2009) identified a similar
management dilemma within a cooperative structure, which is the credibility and
operational gap between professional management and membership. She cited the view
of Soppexcca’s professional manager on this dilemma, being the constraints imposed
by high levels of illiteracy of the majority of the cooperative members, low education
levels of the representatives on the board and their lack of knowledge about how to
manage legal, commercial, organizational and fair trade requirements. This mirrors
more widespread cooperative experience and signals that the empowerment dimension
is the critical element, or rather the disempowerment of the membership, which must be
addressed to ensure the transition to a sustainable organization.
However, both Soppexcca and its members may be reluctant to spread power in a
way that could create a management elite, given previous experiences with cooperative
mismanagement and the overall shortage of effective business skills in Nicaragua.
In theory, a corporate structure could provide greater input into governance and thus
represent an improvement over the cooperative structure in Soppexcca’s case. After all,
it was Soppexcca’s previous owners (the debt-holding coffee buyers) who played a key
role in establishing the professional management which is credited with Soppexcca’s
success in its repositioning within certified coffee markets. In practice, neither
Soppexcca nor its members are likely to accept a return to the external oversight,
especially if this were to result in reduced support from NGOs and projects, the
payment of corporate taxes and other fees, and greater uncertainty in certified
high-quality product markets.
Important conclusions can be drawn from this case. The first is the advantage of the
hybrid member cooperative- secondary corporate structure, and that by being thus
organized during a critical stage in its development, Soppexcca likely accelerated its
recovery and development as a viable commercial enterprise. It highlights the
importance of having strong professional administration, and market linkages during
the initial development phase that can subsequently evolve into enduring, profitable
private sector linkages. However, the transition from private enterprise to cooperative
has not been easy. Soppexcca has struggled to empower its members to contribute to
cooperative governance, and NGO and donor partners have not yet emphasized such
democratization and empowerment.
Second, on the “quantity” of support, has it been worth it? The considerable external
support involved in the restructuring of Soppexcca implies that it may serve as a model
for collective enterprise rescue but should not serve as a model for organizational
development in most contexts. But Soppexcca is not alone in having received
significant intervention: there are other notable examples of high levels of support





(e.g. Cecocafen in Nicaragua (certified coffee), El Ceibo in Bolivia (organic cacao),
Forestcom and El Pino in Guatemala (certified timber and fresh vegetables,
respectively), and in Africa (NASFAM in Malawi in diverse agricultural product
markets). The Soppexcca case illustrates the willingness of donors and NGOs to
support more advanced cooperatives when such support has the potential to impact the
wellbeing of smallholder producers. After all, much of the support channeled through
Soppexcca was directed towards helping poor coffee growers to build their assets
following the coffee crisis. In the context of the coffee crisis, when the external
environment was particularly unfavorable for coffee producers, it was not difficult to
justify the private and NGO support to rescue the business. And for buyers, the debt
was repaid and valued supplies of high quality certified product were secured. But this
level of support cannot be widely scaled out.
Third, the case furnishes more evidence also on the quality of support for the
creation of sustainable cooperatives. In particular, stimulation of viable collective
enterprise is a long-term process and requires patient external support. In this, the
experience of Soppexcca again is not unique: also in Nicaragua, Fraser et al. (2013)
record the demise due to corruption and mismanagement of the second tier cooperative
Giprocoor in the late-1990s. Giprocoor was then reconstituted with an imposed
management and the support of European buyers as a private limited company,
Sepasa, “to clean up Giprocoor’s corruption and uphold fair-trade values through good
management and business principles” (p. 12). Smallholders, who had realized the
significance of property rights due to previous experience of land appropriation
and forced migration, expressed a willingness to repay to European buyers the
accumulated debts. Having tied in external commercial support, Sepasa moved into
recovery after 2003. Efforts began later to encourage the organization to revert to a
cooperative structure.
Soppexcca and Sepasa have more in common. The reasons for formation were
partly cultural and ideological: they included the desire that members might have some
democratic participation in governance; the awareness that international donor
organizations specifically wanted to work with cooperatives. Equally important were
the business reasons, to minimize the organization’s tax burden which is higher for
corporate entities than for cooperatives; and to sustain the strong link between the fair
trade movement and collective smallholder organization. Moreover, for producers, the
memory of the fair trade premium received through sales through the cooperative
sector during the coffee crisis will also have persisted. Finally, a favorable macro-
political condition was the return of the Sandinista government in 2007 which created a
more enabling environment and lent support to the social empowerment aims of
cooperatives: it was said that “the only way to secure social development programs was
through further embedding the Union of Organized Cooperatives (UCA) within local
cooperative ‘reality’ […]” Fraser et al. (2013).
The Soppexcca experience also echoes the analysis by Bebbington et al. (1996) of the
development trajectory of the cocoa cooperative El Ceibo in Bolivia. They attributed its
success to slow growth through genuine vicissitudes into a complex, multifunctional
and modern organization, yet retaining a focus on the core business of cocoa marketing
into the international fair trade, organic cocoa sector. They acknowledged that the
achievements of El Ceibo “have not come cheaply, and remind us that building capacity
in a campesino [sic] organization requires significant and sustained investment of
resources” (p. 202). Similarly, among the key factors were the quality of external




sixteen years of continued technical assistance; donor-facilitated direct network
linkages into export markets; and a range of organizational support services, including
both technical assistance and continued and intense support for the formation of
human resources.
In conclusion, Soppexcca is representative of the traumas of forming collective
organizations in developing countries, particularly in agribusiness. The intention of
this study is not to claim representativeness, however, but there are wider lessons to be
learned as the development community reiterates its policies of support to producer
organizations. It highlights the long and winding road for development: the level of
support suggests that it is a costly success, but many of those business costs have been
recovered. For Soppexcca, and for other development initiatives that could benefit from
this lesson, the particularly significant dynamic is the valuable and consistent support
from networking with business partners, not just working with NGOs and donors
(Sergaki, 2010). Donovan et al. (2008) argued that external stakeholders such as donors,
NGOs and value chain partners may have to be committed for longer than a medium
term of, say, four to five years, with a focus on building the “soft” assets associated
with human skills of management and governance. “Soft asset” formation may
continue to be necessary for years after the technical assistance, infrastructure and
financial support have been scaled down. Thus the need is urgent to create
economically sustainable cooperatives in shorter periods of time. Potential short cuts
will depend on delivery of effective and well-articulated technical, business and
financial services throughout the organizational development process. The design and
delivery of these services require alignment and harmonization between government
policy, the approaches of development agencies, NGOs, research and training centers to
skills training, and most of all, closer collaboration, communication and coordination in
the value chain among cooperatives, buyers and processors.
Note
1. The literature does not often differentiate clearly between diverse organizational forms, using
interchangeably such terms such as farmer and producer cooperatives, associations,
organizations, and community and collective enterprises. Here we refer to cooperatives as the
predominant form of collective organization, one function of which is collective enterprise,
which we differentiate from the social functions of cooperatives.
References
Abebaw, D. and Haile, M.G. (2013), “The impact of cooperatives on agricultural technology
adoption: empirical evidence from Ethiopia”, Food Policy, Vol. 38, February, pp. 82-91.
Bacon, C. (2005), “Confronting the coffee crisis: can fair trade, organic, and specialty coffees
reduce small-scale farmer vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua?”, World Development,
Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 497-511.
Bacon, C.M. (2010), “A spot of coffee in crisis: Nicaraguan smallholder cooperatives, fair trade
networks, and gendered empowerment”, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 37 No. 2,
pp. 50-71.
Bebbington, A., Quisbert, J. and Trujillo, G. (1996), “Technology and rural development strategies
in a small farmer organization: lessons from Bolivia for rural policy and practice”, Public
Administration and Development, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 195-213.
Bijman, J., Muradian, R. and Cechin, A. (2011), “Agricultural cooperatives and value chain
coordination”, in Helmsing, A.H.J. and Vellema, S. (Eds), Value Chains, Social Inclusion and





CEPAL (2009), Nicaragua: Evolución Económica durante 2008 y Perspectivas para 2009. Mexico
City, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, available at: www.eclac.cl/
publicaciones/xml/1/36681/L913.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012)
Commodities Street Journal (2012), Nicaragua, available at: http://commoditiesstreetjournal.com/
commodity-country-profiles/nicaragua/ (accessed August 22, 2012)
Denaux, G. (2008), Lo Veo y No lo Creo: La Historia de 11 Años de la UCA Soppexcca, Jinotega,
Nicaragua.
Donovan, J. and Poole, N.D. (2013), “Asset building in response to value chain development:
lessons from taro producers in Nicaragua”, International Journal of Agricultural
Sustainability, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 23-37.
Donovan, J. and Stoian, D. (2012), 5Capitals: A Tool for Assessing the Poverty Impacts of Value
Chain Development, CATIE, Turrialba.
Donovan, J., Stoian, D. and Poole, N.D. (2008), “A global review of rural community
enterprises: the long and winding road for creating viable businesses, and potential
shortcuts”, Technical Bulletin No. 29, Rural Enterprise Collection No. 2, CATIE, Turrialba.
FAO (2013), The State of Food and Agriculture 2012, Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, Rome, available at: www.fao.org/docrep/017/i3028e/i3028e.pdf (accessed
May 2, 2013)
Flores, M., Bratescu, A., Martínez, J.O., Oviedo, J.A. and Acosta, A. (2002), Centroamérica: El
Impacto De La Caída De Los Precios Del Café, Comisión Económica para América Latina y
el Caribe, Mexico City, available at: www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml¼/
publicaciones/xml/9/9679/P9679.xml&xsl¼/mexico/tpl/p9f.xsl&base¼/tpl/top-bottom.xslt
(accessed May 1, 2012).
Fraser, J., Fisher, E. and Arce, A. (2013), “Reframing ‘crisis’ in fair trade coffee production:
trajectories of agrarian change in Nicaragua”, Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 14 No. 1,
pp. 52-73.
Gitter, S.R., Weber, J.G., Barham, B.L., Callenes, M. and Valentine, J.L. (2012), “Fair trade-organic
coffee cooperatives, migration, and secondary schooling in Southern Mexico”, The Journal
of Development Studies, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 445-463.
González-Pérez, M.-A. and Gutiérrez-Viana, S. (2012), “Cooperation in coffee markets: the case of
Vietnam and Colombia”, Journal of Agribusiness in Developing and Emerging Economies,
Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 57-73.
Haggar, J., Jérez, R., Cuadra, L., Alvarado, U. and Soto, G. (2012), “Environmental and economic
costs and benefits from sustainable certification of coffee in Nicaragua”, Food Chain, Vol. 2
No. 1, pp. 24-41.
House of Commons International Development Committee (2013), “Global food security”, first
report of session 2013-14, The Stationery Office Limited, London.
Humphrey, J. and Navas-Alemán, L. (2010), Value Chains, Donor Interventions and Poverty
Reduction: A Review of Donor Practice, Sussex, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
IFAD (2013), Pioneering Direct Farmer Support in Guinea, International Fund for Agricultural
Development, Rome, available at: www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/voice/tags/guinea/
guinea_pioneering (accessed May 2, 2013).
Kachule, R., Poole, N.D. and Dorward, A. (2005), “Farmer organisations in Malawi: the
organisation study”, Final report for “Farmer Organisations for Market Access”, DFID
Crop Post Harvest Research Programme (R2875), Imperial College London, London.
Kilian, B., Jones, C., Pratt, L. and Villalobos, A. (2006), “Is sustainable agriculture a viable strategy
to improve farm income in Central America? A case study on coffee”, Journal of Business




Kroeker, C.J. (1996), “The cooperative movement in Nicaragua: empowerment and
accompaniment of severely disadvantaged peasants”, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 52
No. 1, pp. 123-138.
Markelova, H., Meinzen-Dick, R., Hellin, J. and Dohrn, S. (2009), “Collective action for smallholder
market access”, Food Policy, Vol. 34 No. 1, pp. 1-7.
Mitchell, J. and Coles, C. (Eds) (2011), Markets and Rural Poverty: Upgrading in Value Chains,
Earthscan and International Development Research Centre, London and Ottawa.
Molnar, A., Liddle, M., Bracer, C., Khare, A., White, A. and Bull, J. (2007), Community-based Forest
Enterprises: Their Status and Potential in Tropical Countries, International Tropical
Timber Organization, Yokohama.
Ortiz-Miranda, D., Moreno-Pérez, O.M. and Moragues-Faus, A.M. (2010), “Innovative strategies of
agricultural cooperatives in the framework of the new rural development paradigms:
the case of the region of Valencia (Spain)”, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 42 No. 3,
pp. 661-677.
Poole, N.D. and de Frece, A. (2010), A Review of Existing Organisational Forms of Smallholder
Farmers’ Associations and their Contractual Relationships with other Market Participants in
the East and Southern African ACP Region, Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, Rome, available at: www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/AAACP/
eastafrica/FAO_AAACP_Paper_Series_No_11_1_.pdf (accessed March 19, 2013).
Poole, N.D., Chitundu, M. and Msoni, R. (2013), “Commercialisation: a meta-approach for
agricultural development among smallholder farmers in Africa?”, Food Policy, Vol. 41,
August, pp. 155-165.
Sergaki, P. (2010), “The role of networks on the competitiveness of agricultural cooperatives and
small-medium enterprises along the supply chain in Greece”, Food Economics – Acta
Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section C, Vol. 7 Nos 2-4, pp. 180-191.
Stoian, D., Donovan, J., Fisk, J. and Muldoon, M. (2012), “Value chain development for rural
poverty reduction: a reality check and a warning”, Enterprise Development and
Microfinance, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 54-69.
The Springfield Centre (2008), The Operational Guide for The Making Markets Work for the
Poor (M4P) Approach, Department for International Development/Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation, London and Berne.
USAID (2004), USAID Supports Coffee Growers Around the Globe, USAID, Washington, DC,
available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA587.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012).
Utting, K. (2009), “Assessing the impact of fair trade coffee: towards an integrative framework”,
Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 86 No. S1, pp. 127-149.
Valkila, J. (2009), “Fair trade organic coffee in Nicaragua: sustainable development or poverty
trap?”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 68 No. 12, pp. 3018-3025.
Valkila, J. and Nygren, A. (2010), “Impacts of fair trade certification on coffee farmers,
cooperatives, and laborers in Nicaragua”, Agriculture and Human Values, Vol. 27 No. 3,
pp. 321-333.
Varangis, P., Siegel, P.B., Giovannucci, D. and Lewin, B. (2003), Dealing with the Coffee Crisis in
Central America: Impacts and Strategies, World Bank, Washington, DC, available at:
www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/04/23/000094946_
03040404262852/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012).
Webber, C.M. and Labaste, P. (2010), Building Competitiveness in Africa’s Agriculture: A Guide to
Value Chain Concepts and Applications, World Bank, Washington, DC, available at: https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2401/524610PUB0AFR0101Official0





Wilson, B.R. (2010), “Indebted to fair trade? Coffee and crisis in Nicaragua”, Geoforum, Vol. 41
No. 1, pp. 84-92.
World Bank (2007), World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, World Bank,
Washington, DC, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/
Resources/WDR_00_book.pdf (accessed March 19, 2013).
World Bank (2012), Global Development Finance, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/global-development-finance (accessed August 2, 2012).
World Bank (2013), Producer Organizations, available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTARD/0,,contentMDK:20450986~isCURL:Y~menuPK:1308455~
pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336682,00.html (accessed May 2, 2013).
About the authors
Dr Nigel Poole initially trained in agricultural sciences and agricultural extension before
completing his PhD at the Wye College, University of London. He has lived and worked in
southern Africa and South America and conducted research in many other regions. Currently he
works at the Centre for Development, Environment and Policy, SOAS, University of London.
Dr Nigel Poole is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: np10@soas.ac.uk
Dr Jason Donovan, after undergraduate and postgraduate studies in the USA, Jason Donovan
worked for many years at the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center
(CATIE), Costa Rica, principally teaching and conducting research in Latin America and the
Caribbean Basin. He completed his PhD at the SOAS, University of London, and currently works
for the World Agroforestry Centre, Lima, Peru.
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com
Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
156
JADEE
4,2
